Agency Theory and Executive Pay
The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma
This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavi…
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Produktdetails
- ISBN: 978-3-319-99969-2
- EAN: 9783319999692
- Produktnummer: 29391045
- Verlag: Springer-Verlag GmbH
- Sprache: Englisch
- Erscheinungsjahr: 2018
- Seitenangabe: 133 S.
- Plattform: PDF
- Masse: 1'654 KB
- Auflage: 1st ed. 2019
- Abbildungen: 8 schwarz-weiße Abbildungen, Bibliographie
Über den Autor
Alexander Pepper is Professor of Management Practice at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. He previously had a long career at PwC, where he was a global leader of PwC's Human Resource Services consulting practice from 2002-2006. He has authored two books, Senior Executive Reward (2006), and The Economic Psychology of Incentives published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015.
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