Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing ri…
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Produktdetails
- ISBN: 978-0-691-09989-7
- EAN: 9780691099897
- Produktnummer: 9867674
- Verlag: Princeton Univ Pr
- Sprache: Englisch
- Erscheinungsjahr: 2002
- Seitenangabe: 344 S.
- Masse: H22.8 cm x B15.2 cm x D2.7 cm 554 g
- Auflage: New
- Gewicht: 554
Über den Autor
George Tsebelis is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics and coauthor of Bicameralism. The recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, a Hoover National Fellowship, and a Russell Sage Fellowship, he has published numerous papers on the institutions of the European Union and on comparative institutional analysis.
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