Disjunctivism
Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception
Does perception provide us with direct and unmediated access to the world around us? The so-called 'argument from illusion ' has traditionally been supposed to show otherwise: from the subject's point of view, perceptual illusions are often indistinguishable from veridical perceptions; hence, perceptual experience, as such, cannot provide us with knowledge of the world, but only with knowledge of how things appear to us. Disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, first proposed by John McDowell and Paul Snowdon in the early 1980s and at the centre of current debates in the philosophy of perception, have been proposed to block this argumen…
Mehr
CHF 56.75
Preise inkl. MwSt. und Versandkosten (Portofrei ab CHF 40.00)
Versandkostenfrei
Produktdetails
- ISBN: 978-1-135-73960-7
- EAN: 9781135739607
- Produktnummer: 33099604
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
- Sprache: Englisch
- Erscheinungsjahr: 2013
- Seitenangabe: 176 S.
- Plattform: PDF
- Masse: 1'761 KB
Über den Autor
Marcus Willaschek is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt am Main, Germany. He has published numerous articles on the philosophy of Kant, and on topics in the philosophy of action, free will and epistemology. He was an editor for the journal Philosophical Explorations from 2005-2010.
10 weitere Werke von Marcus (Hrsg.) Willaschek:
Bewertungen
Anmelden