Incentives to Pander
How Politicians Use Corporate Welfare for Political Gain
Policies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal ince…
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Produktdetails
- ISBN: 978-1-108-31442-8
- EAN: 9781108314428
- Produktnummer: 26131720
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Sprache: Englisch
- Erscheinungsjahr: 2018
- Seitenangabe: 0 S.
- Plattform: PDF
- Masse: 2'638 KB
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