Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology

This anthology offers a unique collection of contributionsfocusing on the discussion about the so-called dual-process theories within thefield of moral psychology. In general, dual-process theories state that incognitive systems, two sorts of processes can be differentiated: an affective,associative process and an analytical, rule-based process. This distinctionrecently entered the debate on the relationship between intuitive and rationalapproaches to explaining the phenomenon of moral judgment.  The increasinginterest in these theories raises questions concerning their general impact onsocial contexts. The anthology aims at presenting stepping-stones of ananalysis of the merits and drawbacks of this development. For that purpose, theauthors discuss general questions concerning the relationship between ethicsand empirical sciences, methodological questions, reassessments of establishedterminology and societal implications of dual-process theories in moralpsychology. ContentsOn the Relationship Between Ethics and Empirical Sciences.- EmpiricalApproaches in Recent Moral Psychology Research.- Reassessments of EstablishedTerminology in Modern Debates.- Societal Implications of Dual-Process Theoriesin Moral Psychology. Target Groups- Lecturers and students of philosophy- Philosophy teachers EditorCordula Brand is a philosopher who is working atthe International Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (IZEW, Universityof Tuebingen).