Value Capture in Disintegrated Value Chains

Using cooperative game theory, this book shows howbargaining structure affects the distribution of value among the constituentfirms of the value chain. Results show that positions in the bargainingstructure most conducive to value capture are those where large complementaritygains are realized and split, ideally, among a small number of negotiators.Further, leveraging case studies from the aviation and home applianceindustries the author suggests that the bargaining structure can be shapedthrough by architecture of the value chain and, in turn, through thearchitecture of the product, and the action of powerful firms to optimize valuecapture.ContentsDeterminants of value captureBargaining structureModeling the effect of bargaining structure on value captureDrivers of bargaining structure and empirical implications of the hierarchy strategyTarget GroupsResearchers and students in the fields of technologymanagement, innovation management, strategic business management, and supplychain managementManagers and practitioners in the fields of businessstrategy, procurement, and supply chain managementThe AuthorAlexander Hoffmann is a researcher in the field oftechnology and innovation management at the TU München, Germany, and a managementconsultant.The EditorsThe series Innovation undEntrepreneurship is edited by Prof. Dr. Nikolaus Franke, Prof. Dietmar Harhoff,Ph.D., Prof. Dr. Joachim Henkel, and Prof. Dr. Carolin Häußler.