Military Effectiveness in the Long War

Efforts to measure progress in the US War on Terror are frustrated by a complex strategic situation and a shadowy network of enemies. The Long War, as the conflict is referred to by many public officials, is likely to remain costly in human and financial terms. Some have suggested that the war will continue for a generation, giving the US ample reason to make sure it is optimally prepared for a long fight. One opportunity to examine the health and endurance of the US war effort lies in the concept of military effectiveness. Military effectiveness is the process by which a military converts its available national resources into fighting power. Contributions from multi-disciplinary researchers, like historians Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, provide a foundation for conceptualizing effectiveness in an intellectual sense. Effectiveness is derived from the application of necessary strategic resources (means) in the right proportions (ways) to achieve specific goals (ends). Designing a methodology to assess a nation's military effectiveness in a Long War requires a sophisticated understanding of the three central features of the conflict: protractedness, irregular warfare, and ideological motivation. The Military Effectiveness Model is built around these traits and analyzes effectiveness across four levels of military activity: political, strategic, operational, and tactical. By focusing exclusively on three requirements necessary for victory - endurance, legitimacy, and deterrence - one is able to render judgment about very specific aspects of effectiveness in a Long War. The Military Effectiveness Model must be validated against historical experience. The French experience in the Algerian War from 1954-1962 provides an insightful case study that invites useful comparisons to the current US situation. In Algeria, success at the tactical and operational levels could never compensate for strategic incoherence and a lack of political support. The war in Algeria