Joint Personnel Recovery: A Contrarian View

On 6 Apr 2009, Secretary Robert Gates announced the termination of the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)-X helicopter procurement program. He stated that, this program has a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution with a single-purpose aircraft. We will take a fresh look at the requirement behind this program and develop a more sustainable approach. The result of this announcement is a period of limbo for Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel Recovery (PR) programs while the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) evaluate the requirement. Although the Secretary referred to CSAR, OSD-Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office and USJFCOM are studying the broader mission set of PR. PR refers to the the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Best described, CSAR is a method (or operational capability) for conducting PR. Since Secretary Gates referred to the CSAR mission, it is logical to investigate the PR mission rather than the CSAR method--the nuances of these terms routinely complicate understanding of PR. This concern for recovering our nation's isolated personnel will not go away in the future or in any way become simpler. In the face of overwhelming military force, US enemies will focus on asymmetric means to erode our political will. In current overseas contingency operations (OCO), US military members find themselves in an increasingly non-linear battlespace that stretches forces and creates vulnerabilities for these enemies to exploit. Our enemies believe that the political clout of a POW or hostage in this era of mass, near instantaneous media can erode political will. As the US faces this non-linear battle space, maintaining a credible recovery force f